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THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995: A
LEGITIMATE ATTEMPT TO CURTAIL FRIVOLOUS
INMATE LAWSUITS AND END THE ALLEGED
MICRO-MANAGEMENT OF STATE PRISONS OR A
VIOLATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS?
INTRODUCTION

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995' ("PLRA") was
signed into law on April 26, 1996. The PLRA was an attempt
by Congress to remedy two problems allegedly plaguing the
federal district courts: the enormous rise in frivolous inmate
litigation and the alleged micro-management of state prisons
by the federal courts.2 Several courts recently have considered
whether the PLRA violates the doctrine of separation of powers
as enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.3 These courts also have considered whether the PLRA violates another aspect of that doctrine, the rule of United States v. Klein,4 as laid out by the
Court over 100 years ago.5
18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (West Supp. 1997) [hereinafter PLRA or the Act].
2 Overhauling the Nation's Prisons, Testimony July 27, 1995, Before Senate

Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
s 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
4 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
r The Act has been challenged on separation of powers, equal protection, and
due process grounds. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Jacobson, No. 96-7957 (2d Cir. Aug. 26,
1997) (holding the PLRA's automatic termination provision constitutional on separation of powers, due process, and equal protection grounds); Gavin v. Branstad,
Nos. 96-3746, 96-3748, 1997 WL 434633 (8th Cir. Aug. 5, 1997) (upholding constitutionality of the PLRA's automatic termination provision on separation of powers,
equal protection, and due process grounds); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir.
1996) (holding the PLRA's automatic termination provision constitutional on separation of powers, equal protection, and due process grounds), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 2460 (1997); Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding
the PLEA's automatic termination provision unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds); Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding the
stay provision of the PLRA unconstitutional on due process and separation of powers grounds); Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (same);
United States v. Michigan, No. 1:84 CV 63 (W.D. Mich. July 3, 1996) (same).

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63: 319

To assess the constitutionality of certain provisions of the
PLRA, it is necessary to consider what effect the PLRA has on
an often used remedy imposed by the courts in prison condition
lawsuits-the consent decree. In order to avoid an adjudication
by the courts that state prisons were being operated unconstitutionally, prison officials over the years have settled claims
made by prisoners and entered into consent decrees.6 These

consent decrees, approved and sanctioned by the courts, represent a final judgment.7 In Plaut, the Supreme Court held that

Congress violated separation of powers principles by legislatively reopening final judgments of Article III courts.8 The
PLRA provides for automatic termination and an automatic
stay of prospective relief' if such relief was granted without
certain findings required by the Act."° Thus, the PLRA may

' A consent decree can be broadly defined as "an agreement between litigants
to settle a lawsuit on mutually acceptable terms that the court agrees to enforce
as a judgment." Bernard T. Shen, Comment, From Jail Cell to Cellular Communication: Should the Rufo Standard be Applied to Antitrust and Commercial Consent
Decrees, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1781, 1786 (1996) (citing Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MicH. L. REV. 321, 325 (1988)). The
PLRA defines a consent decree as "any relief entered by the court that is based in
whole or in part upon the consent or acquiescence of the parties but does not
include private settlements." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(g)(1).
' See Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (citing
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992)).
8 Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1463.
The PLRA defines prospective relief as "all relief other than compensatory
monetary damages." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(g)(7).
10 See 18 U.S.CA
§ 3626. The relevant provisions are as follows:
[Section] 3626. Appropriate remedies with respect to prison conditions
Ca) REQUIREMENTS FOR RELIEF.(1) PROSPECTIVE RELIEF.-(A) Prospective relief in any civil action
with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary
to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or
plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief
unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no
further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and
is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse
impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system
caused by the relief.
(b) TERMINATION OF RELIEF.(1) TERMINATION OF PROSPECTIVE RELIEF.-(A) In any civil action
with respect to prison conditions in which prospective relief is ordered,
such relief shall be terminable upon the motion of any party or intervener-
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have the effect of forcing the courts to reopen consent decrees,
which in some cases have been final judgments for many
years. Additionally, the PLRA may violate the doctrine of separation of powers by unconstitutionally prescribing a rule of
decision without changing the underlying substantive law as
prohibited by the rule in Klein.
The PLRA limits the district court's ability to grant prospective relief. The Act provides, inter alia, that if prospective
relief is granted, it shall "extend no further than necessary to
correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff."" The Act further provides that prospective relief is subject to termination upon motion by any party or intervenor (1)
two years after the date the court had previously granted such
relief; (2) one year after denial of a motion to terminate; or

(i) 2 years after the date the court granted or approved the prospective
relief,
(ii) 1 year after the date the court has entered an order denying termination of prospective relief under this paragraph; or
(iii) in the case of an order issued on or before the date of enactment of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 2 years after such date of enactment.
(2) IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF PROSPECTIVE RELIEF.-In any
civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener
shall be entitled to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if
the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the
court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.
(c) SETTLEMENTS.(1) CONSENT DECREES.-In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, the court shall not enter or approve a consent decree unless it
complies with the limitations on relief set forth in subsection (a).
(e) PROCEDURE FOR MOTIONS AFFECTING PROSPECTIVE RELIEF.(2) AUTOMATIC STAY.-Any prospective relief subject to a pending
motion shall be automatically stayed during the period(A)(i) beginning on the 30th day after such motion is filed, in the case of
a motion made under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b); or
(ii) beginning on the 180th day after such motion is filed, in the case of
a motion made under any other law; and
(B) ending on the date the court enters a final order ruling on the motion.
18 U.S.CAL § 3626 (West Supp. 1997).
" 18 U.S.C-A § 3626(a)(1).
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(3) two years after the enactment of the PLRA. 2 Immediate
termination of prospective relief is required if the relief was
previously approved by the courts without a finding that the
relief "is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to
correct the violation of a Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of a Federal
right." 3 Finally, the Act invites the filing of a motion to stay
any prospective relief previously granted. 4 This section provides an automatic stay beginning thirty days after the filing
of the motion and ending on the date a final order is issued.15
This Note focuses on how the PLRA violates two aspects of
the doctrine of separation of powers as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. and United
States v. Klein. 6 Part I discusses the plain meaning of the
Act, its legislative history and recent litigation involving the
PLRA. Part II analyzes the finality of consent decrees and
discusses the doctrine of separation of powers. This Note concludes that the PLRA violates that doctrine by legislatively
altering final judgments of Article III courts and by prescribing
a rule of decision.

12 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(1).
13 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3626(b)(2) [§§ 3626(b)(1); (b)(2), hereinafter the Automatic
Termination Provision].
"' 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(e) [hereinafter the Stay Provision].

11 Id.
16

The PLRA has been found unconstitutional on due process grounds. See, e.g.,

Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362, 1369-70 (W.D. Mich. 1996); United States v.
Michigan, No. 1:84 CV 63, slip op. at 16-17 (W.D. Mich. July 3, 1996); but see
Benjamin v. Jacobson, No. 96-7957, slip op. at 27-29 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997);
Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 374-75 (4th Cir. 1996). The due process challenge
to the PLRA is beyond the scope of this note. Plaintiffs also have attacked the
PLRA on equal protection grounds. These attacks so far have been unsuccessful.
See Benjamin, No. 96-7957, slip op. at 25-27; Plyler, 100 F.3d at 373-74. The equal
protection challenge to the PLRA is also beyond the scope of this note.
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I. THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995
A. PlainMeaning
1. Requirements for Relief-18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)
Section 3626(a)(1)(A) of the PLRA sets forth three basic
requirements for granting prospective relief in prison condition
lawsuits: the relief must be narrowly drawn, it must extend no
further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right [of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs], and must be the
least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right.' The PLRA also requires the court to "give
substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or
the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief."" The term "substantial weight" remains undefined in
the Act; however, "prospective relief is defined by the PLRA as
any relief other than compensatory money damages.'"
As long as the requirements of § 3626(a)(1)(A) are met, a
court may grant preliminary injunctive relief for no more than
ninety days.20 Section 3626(a)(2), which authorizes this preliminary injunctive relief, also allows a court to enter a temporary restraining order ("TRO"). Either because of an error in
drafting or because of the short term nature of a TRO, this
section does not, by its own terms, require the three findings
set forth in § (a)(1)(A) before a court can grant a TRO. Such an
interpretation is logical because § (a)(2) recites the three requirements as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief,
but it does not set forth those requirements as a prerequisite
to the granting of a TRO. Alternatively, the findings required
by § (a)(1)(A) may apply to the granting of a TRO because that
section applies to "any civil action with respect to prison conditions."2 ' The definitional section of the Act broadly defines
"any civil action with respect to prison conditions" as any "civil
proceeding arising under Federal law with respect to condi-

1718 U.S.CJA

§ 3626(a)(1)(A).

18 Id.
"
20
21

18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(g)(7).
18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(2).
18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
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tions of confinement."2 Thus, it is possible to interpret the
requirements of § (a)(1)(A) as applying to the granting of a
TRO.
2. Termination of Relief-18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)
Section 3626(b)(1) requires termination of prospective
relief, upon motion of a party or intervenor (1) two years after
the approval of prospective relief; (2) one year after the denial
of a motion to terminate such relief; or (3) two years after the
enactment of the PLRA. 2 In cases of unremedied constitutional violations, this section invites relitigation of the issues
underlying prison condition consent decrees.
Section (b)(2) mandates the automatic termination of prospective relief, without regard to the time limitations set forth
in § (b)(1), if such relief was granted in the absence of the
findings required by § (a)(1)(A).' Unlike § (a)(1)(A), § (b)(2) is
retroactive. Section (b)(2) requires findings in accordance with
§ (a)(1)(A) for any prospective relief previously granted.2 5
3. Automatic Stay-18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(e)
Regardless of any findings made by the court with respect
to continued constitutional violations at a prison operated
under a consent decree, upon motion for termination, § 3626(e)
requires an automatic stay of any prospective relief beginning
thirty days after the filing of such a motion and ending on the
date a final order is issued." Similar to § (b)(2), § (e)(2) is retroactive. These sections require a federal court to abandon
enforcement of a consent decree permanently, in the case of §
(b)(2), and temporarily, in the case of § (e)(2).

18 U.S.CA § 3626(g)(2). This section notably excludes habeas corpus proceedings from the strictures of the Act.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1).
24 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(b)(2).
- See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(2) (repeating findings required for prospective
relief contained in § (a)(1)(A)). Those findings are discussed supra notes 17-22 and
accompanying text.
26 18 U.S.C-.A § 3626(e)(2).
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B. Legislative History
As early as July 1995, Congress was aware that the PLRA
was subject to attack on separation of powers grounds.'
Those concerns, expressed by several Senators in opposition to
the Act, were not addressed by the Act's proponents. Instead,
these proponents focused their concerns on the enormous rise
in frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners and the alleged micro-

management of state prisons by the federal courts.' Although
one might expect legislation with such far reaching effects as
the PLRA to be the subject of significant debate, the legislative
history of the statute is minimal.' The PLRA originated in
the House of Representatives as H.R. 667, the Violent Crimi-

nal Incarceration Act of 1995." It was later added to an omnibus appropriations bill, which was vetoed by President Clinton

' See Overhauling the Nation's Prisons, supra note 2 (statement of Associate
Attorney General John Schmidt warning the committee that the PLRA was subject
to attack on separation of powers grounds), reprinted in 142 CONG. EC. S22972300 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996).
28 See, eg., 141 CONG. REC. S7527 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Kyl); 141 CONG. REC. S14,316 (day ed. Sept. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
' Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that "a
single Senate hearing before the Judiciary Committee, one substantive House Report, and some floor debate is all we can find"), affd in part, reu'd in part, No.
96-7957 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997). Research has not disclosed much beyond what the
district court in Benjamin found. See 142 CONG. REC. S3703-04 (daily ed. Apr. 19,
1996); 142 CONG. REC. S2296-2300 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996); 141 COIIG. REC.
H14,105-06 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995); 141 CONG. EC. S14,626-29 (daily ed. Sept.
29, 1995); 141 CONG. REC. S14,413-14, S14,417-19 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995); 141
CONG. REC. S14,316-17 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1995); Overhauling the Nation's Prisons,
supra note 2; 141 CONG. REC. 57524-27 (daily ed. May 25, 1995); HR. REP. No.
104-21 (1995).
30 H.R. REP. No. 104-21 (1995). H.R. REP. No. 104-21 was the report accompanying H.R. 667. See H.R. 667, 104th Cong. (1995). Title II of HR. 667 covered
frivolous inmate litigation and was called the Stepping Abusive Prisoner Lawsuits
Act. Title DI of H.R. 667 covered limitations on prospective relief and was called
the Stop Turning Out Prisoners Act (STOP). Those two titles, with minor modifications, along with other provisions, became what is now the PLRA. The PLRA
itself was Title VII of the Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110
Stat. 1321 (1996).
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in December 1995."' The President was then presented with
another appropriations bill, again including the PLRA, and on
April 26, 1996, he signed that bill into law.32
1. Separation of Powers Concerns
In his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in
March 1996, Associate Attorney General John Schmidt expressed concerns about the constitutionality of the PLRA.3"
Schmidt was particularly concerned with the provision requiring immediate termination of prospective relief 34
The application of these restrictions to such relief raises constitutional concerns under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Plaut
v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.....
The Court held in that case that
legislation which retroactively interferes with final judgments can

constitute an unconstitutional encroachment on judicial authority .... [The application of proposed 18 U.S.C. 3626(b) to orders in
pre-enactment final judgments would raise serious constitutional

problems.35

Although Schmidt did express doubt as to whether the decision
in Plaut was fully applicable to prospective long term relief,"
his concerns were clearly identified in the record and were
adopted by at least six Senators.37 Interestingly, proponents of
the Act did not address the claims made by Schmidt.
31 142 CONG. REc. 3704-05 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (noting that President Clinton's veto was not based upon the provisions of
the PLRA, but rather that it was based on the ongoing fight between Congress
and the President over balancing the federal budget).
82 See Williams v. Edwards, 87 F.3d 126, 133 (5th Cir. 1996).
See Overhauling the Nation's Prisons, supra note 2 reprinted in 142 CONG.
REC. S2297-2300 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996). Mr. Schmidt's testimony was given
during the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearings on what was then the Stop
Turning Out Prisoners Act (STOP). For the procedural history of the PLRA, see
supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
s, See 18 U.S.C-A. § 3626(b).
s 142 CONG. REC. S2299 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (citing Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995)).
38 142 CONG. REC. S2299 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996).
37 See 142 CONG. REc. S2297 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (letter to Attorney General Janet Reno from Senators Fred Thompson, James M. Jeffords, Edward M.
Kennedy, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and Jeff Bingaman). The Senators suggested that
the "Administration negotiate changes in the PLRA that remedy the serious . . .
problems outlined by Mr. Schmidt and other experts." Id. See also 142 CONG. REC.
S2297-2300 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Simon printing in the
record the separation of powers concerns of Mr. Schmidt).
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2. Proponents' Concerns
a. CurtailingFrivolous Inmate Lawsuits
Much of the early legislative history of the PLRA focused

on the rise in frivolous inmate litigation.' Then Senator Robert Dole, one of several sponsors of an earlier version of the
PLRA, noted that the number of claims of cruel and unusual
punishment had grown from 6,600 in 1975 to more than 39,000
in 1994."9 Senator Dole also cited an analysis conducted by

the National Association of Attorneys General, which estimated the financial impact of
approximately $81.3 million
earlier version of the PLRA,
than one out of every four

frivolous inmate litigation to be
annually."' Another sponsor of an
Senator Jon Kyl, added that more
cases filed in federal court were

brought by prisoners.4 ' He further noted that the "courts have
complained about the abundance of such cases[,]" and that

such cases often are meritless.42

-"See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 57527 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Kyl reading into the record an article; see Walter Berns, Sue the Warden, Sue the
Chef, Sue the Gardener... , WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1995, at A12, documenting
frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners). In the Wall Street Journal article, Bers
writes: 'Among [a federal appeals court judge's] examples of 'excessive filings':
more than 100 by Harry

rankli

....

,

184 in three years by John Robert De-

mos, and-so far the winning score-more than 700 by the Teverend' Clovis Carl
Green Jr." Id (internal quotations in original). Mr. Berns describes the PLRA as a
reasonable way of cutting down on frivolous prisoner lawsuits. Id. Mr. Berns laments prisoners use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to "complain of just about anything and
everything." Id. Such prisoner complaints, according to Mr. Berns, include claims
of rape by prison guards and claims that being served the wrong kind of peanut
butter has constitutional significance. Id. Senator Kyl offered for the record two
David Letterman-style 'Top Ten" lists. 141 CONG. REC. S14,629-30 (daily ed. Sept.
29, 1995) (offering such examples as an inmate who sued because his Gameboy
electronic game was taken away, one who sued because he was not invited to a
pizza party, one who sued claiming that being forced to listen to country and
western music constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and one who sued 66
corrections officials for implanting mind control devices).
39 141 CoNG. REC. S7524 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (quoting Berns, supra note
38, at A12).
40 141 CONG. REC. S14,417-18 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (noting that "the vast
majority of the $81.3 million figure is attributable to ... non-meritorious cases").
41 141 CONG. 1EC. S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1996). Senator Kyl noted that,
according to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 60,086 of the 238,590
district court cases filed in 1994 were filed by prisoners.
42 Id.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63: 319

Opponents of the PLRA did not take issue with the
legislation's objective of reducing the number of frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners.43 Their concern was that the PLRA
went much further than necessary to accomplish this goal."
Opponents argued that by drastically limiting the ability of
prisoners to file suit, the PLRA also had the effect of limiting
the ability of prisoners to remedy genuine constitutional violations caused by prison overcrowding, deficiencies in prison
management,
and abuses by prison officials and other prison45

ers.

b. Stopping the Alleged Micro-Management of State Prisons
In addition to concerns over the rise in frivolous inmate
litigation, proponents of the PLRA argued that the legislation
was necessary to curtail district court's micro-management of
state run prisons. According to one estimate, the prison systems of more than thirty states are subject to federal court
oversight.46 Proponents argued that the federal bench has
gone too far in managing our nation's prisons, and has over-

' See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S2296 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) (expressing discontent with the PLRA because it went much farther than
merely reducing the number of frivolous lawsuits); Id. at S2297 (statement of Sen.
Simon) (describing the PLRA as going much too far).
4 Id. at S2296-97.
4' Opponents cited examples of alleged constitutional violations which were the
subject of prison consent decrees and would be affected by the legislation. See, e.g.,
141 CONG. REC. S14,628 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden) (noting that children located in a juvenile detention facility in Pennsylvania at 160%
of capacity were often beaten by staff members using chains and other objects and
that such problems were not resolved until a court order was entered). See also
142 CONG. REC. S2297 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Simon) (noting
that "[h]istery is replete with examples of egregious violations of prisoners'
rights . . . [revealing] abuses and inhumane treatment which cannot be justified
no matter what the crime."). Sen. Simon also noted that prison overcrowding creates a serious threat to the public, prison officials, and the prisoners themselves.
Id. The PLRA, he further noted, makes it nearly impossible for courts to impose
population caps because it requires findings that were never made when the litigation was commenced. Id. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a) (text reprinted supra note
10).
46 See Overhauling the Nation's Prisons, supra note 2 (July 27,
1995) (state-

ment of Sen. Hatch (citing CRIMINAL JUSTIcE INSTITUTE, INC., THE CORRECTIONS

YEARBOOK (1994)). As of January 1994, some 244 institutions in 34 jurisdictions
were under federal court control. Id. 24 of those institutions had population caps.
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stepped its equitable remedial power by requiring prison officials to comply with consent decrees.4 7 One of the Act's proponents, Senator Spencer Abraham, argued that compliance with
federal court consent decrees "undermine[s] the legitimacy and
punitive deterrent effect of prison sentences.""
In response to charges that states face an enormous fiscal
burden in defending prison condition lawsuits, opponents of
the Act cited the fiscal impact of the PLRA on the federal court
system.49 Section 3626(b)(1), which provides for termination of
prospective relief one year after denial of a motion to terminate
or two years after the approval of such relief, plainly invites
continued relitigation of prison consent decrees. The legislation
does not appropriate any additional funds to the federal courts
to offset the cost of this inevitable litigation.'o
In his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Steve J. Martin, a former official with the Texas Department
of Corrections, offered some practical reasons why the PLRAs
limitation on consent decrees is misguided." Martin noted
that prison consent decrees are often the product of endless
hours of extensive negotiations between prison officials and
inmates, which are "carefully tailored to a particularized set of
factual circumstances." 2 He further testified that the termination of these consent decrees will force corrections officials
across the nation to immediately prepare for trial.' Martin
took issue with Congress simply stripping the states of their
ability to use consent decrees to remedy constitutional violations."

' See, e.g., Overhauling the Nation's Prisons, supra note 2 (July 27, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Hatch).
141 CONG. REc. S14,316 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1995).
41 142 CONG. REC. S2296 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy
quoting an estimate by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts that

the PLRA would cost the federal court system $239 million).
50 Id.

" Overhauling the Nation's Prisons, supra note 2 (testimony of former corrections official Steve J. Martin).
" Overhauling the Nation's Prisons, supra note 2 (testimony of former corrections official Steve J. Martin).
"Overhauling the Nation's Prisons, supra note 2 (testimony of former corrections official Steve J. Martin).
'4 Mr. Martin urged the committee to leave it up to the states to decide
whether to settle this type of litigation or to proceed to trial. Overhauling the
Nation's Prisons, supra note 2 (testimony of former corrections official Steve J.
Martin).
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The difference of opinion over what effect district court
intervention has had on state criminal justice systems is evident from examining the remarks made on both sides of a
controversy involving Philadelphia's prison system. Lynne
Abraham, the District Attorney of Philadelphia and an early
proponent of the Act, testified before the Subcommittee on
Crime of the House Judiciary Committee about the effect of a
court imposed prison population cap contained in a consent
decree at issue in the case of Harrisv. City of Philadelphia."
According to Abraham, judges in Philadelphia are not able to
make individualized determinations of bail.56 Instead, the determination of whether to send to jail a defendant who either
cannot afford bail or who is denied bail rests upon whether the
defendant has been charged with a violent crime.57 She further noted that the result of this policy is that the number of
bench warrants for defendants who fail to show up for trial has
increased from 18,000 to 50,000.68 Abraham attributed some
9,732 new crimes in an eighteen month period to the release of
prisoners as a result of the population cap.59 The micro-man-

" See Subcommittee on Crime of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, Testimony January 19, 1995, 104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter Subcom.
mittee on Crime] (testimony of Lynne Abraham). See also Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311 (1995) (discussing the long history of court involvement
with the Philadelphia consent decrees since the inception of a prisoner suit in
1982 claiming that overcrowding violated prisoners rights under the First, Eighth,
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments). The consent decrees at issue in Harris, referred to by Ms. Abraham in her testimony, were first approved in 1986 and created a prison population cap in the Philadelphia prison system. Id. at 1315. Another consent decree was entered into in 1991, because the city was unable to
comply with the previous agreement. Id at 1316.
'
Subcommittee on Crime, supra note 55 (testimony of Lynne Abraham).
Subcommittee on Crime, supra note 55 (testimony of Lynne Abraham). She
noted that non-violent crimes include: "stalking, car jacking, robbery with a baseball bat, burglary, drug dealing, vehicular homicide, manslaughter, terroristic
threats, [and] gun charges .... " Subcommittee on Crime, supra note 55 (testimony of Lynne Abraham).
"' Subcommittee on Crime, supra note 55 (testimony of Lynne Abraham). Ms.
Abraham noted that the police do not bother looking for these fugitives because
they will be released anyway due to the population cap. Subcommittee on Crime,
supra note 55 (testimony of Lynne Abraham).
9 Subcommittee on Crime, supra note 55 (testimony of Lynne Abraham) (noting
also that the failure to appear rate of prison cap releases exceeds that of traditional bail releases).
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agement of the state's prisons by federal courts, she charged, is
an "unnecessary [intrusion] into one of the most basic functions of state government-its criminal justice system.'
In response to Abraham's criticism of the federal district
court's alleged intrusion into the management of Philadelphia
jails, David Richman, attorney for the plaintiffs in Harris,
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee during its
hearings on the PLRA.6 According to Richman, the decision
to settle the lawsuit and enter into the consent decree was
made by the Mayor of Philadelphia because it was in the public interest to improve the city's jails and its criminal justice
system.62 Richman made clear that the prison "cap," as described by Abraham, was actually a "threshold which, when
crossed, triggers a moratorium on the admission of persons
charged with non-violent crimes and lesser drug offenses.'
He asserted that the "cap" does not apply to those convicted of
crimes.' The proponents of the legislation were persuaded by
Abraham's testimony.'
The minimal legislative history of the PLRA has two main
themes. Proponents argued that the legislation was necessary
to curtail frivolous inmate litigation and to end the alleged
micro-management of state run institutions. In response, the
opposition argued that the PLRA went too far by curtailing

' Subcommittee on Crime, supra note 55 (testimony of Lynne Abraham). Ms.
Abraham stated that Philadelphia is in the process of building new prisons, and
that the city is 'committed to devoting adequate resources to ensure humane prison conditions." The fact that Philadelphia jails continue to be subject to these
consent decrees is largely a result of the city's inability to build jail cells at a
quick enough pace in the thirteen years since the consent decrees were entered.
Overhauling the Nation's Prisons, supra note 2 (testimony of David Richman, attorney for the plaintiffs in Harris v. City of Philadelphia).
6'1Overhauling the Nation's Prisons, supra note 2 (testimony of David
Richman).
' Overhauling the Nation's Prisons, supra note 2 (testimony of David
Richman).
' Overhauling the Nation's Prisons, supra note 2 (testimony of David Richman)
(emphasis added). Mr. Richman also noted that the then current prison population
in Philadelphia is actually 20% to 40% over the agreed upon capacity. Overhauling
the Nation's Prisons, supra note 2 (testimony of David Richman).
6 Overhauling the Nation's Prisons, supra note 2 (testimony of David Richman)
(emphasis added).
141 CONG. REC. S14,316 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (citing the same statistics presented by Ms. Abraham in her testimony before
the House of Representatives).
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courts' ability to remedy genuine constitutional violations.
Debate over the constitutionality of the Act was more limited
than the debate over the need for such legislation. Separation
of powers concerns, raised by Associate Attorney General
Schmidt and echoed by several Senators, were never addressed
by the Act's proponents. 6
C. Recent PLRA Litigation
Since the PLRA was enacted in April 1996, there have
only been a small number of courts that have passed on the
constitutionality of the Act.6 7 Considering the number of
states with consent decrees, more decisions addressing the
Act's constitutionality are sure to be decided in the near future. To illustrate the division between the courts that have
upheld the Act and those that have struck it down as a violation of separation of powers, it is helpful to briefly examine
some recent decisions on both sides. Two district courts in
Michigan have recently issued a total of four decisions (the

66 One commentator recently tried to explain why Congress is apt to ignore
warnings of a statute's unconstitutionality. See Paul Reidinger, Politically Expedient, 82-Aug A.B.A. J. 79 (1996). Reidinger argues that "[plartisans invoke the
Constitution when it seems to support their argument, and ignore it when it doesn't." Id. He cites recent examples from the 104th Congress including the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (West Supp. I 1996). The Communications
Decency Act was unanimously struck down by the Supreme Court as violative of
the First Amendment. See ACLU v. Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). Reidinger also
cites the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996),
which is destined for the Supreme Court if and when the Hawaii Supreme Court
determines the legality of gay marriages, see Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394,
1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (holding a sex based marriage statute, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1 (1993), violative of Hawaii's Equal Protection Clause).
' See supra note 5. Several courts have avoided passing on the constitutionality of the PLRA by interpreting the Act so as to not raise constitutional concerns.
See Benjamin v. Jacobson, No. 96-7957, slip op. at 7-12 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997)
(avoiding separation of powers concerns by distinguishing the term "prospective
relief," as used in the Act, from a consent decree containing a provision for prospective relief and recognizing that without such a distinction the Act would raise
serious concerns under Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.); Inmates of Suffolk County
Jail v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 952 F. Supp. 869 (D. Mass. 1997) (same); Madrid
v. Gomez, 940 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (avoiding separation of powers concerns by interpreting the PLRA's limitations on prospective relief as inapplicable to
a provision of a consent decree setting the compensation of a special master in a
prison conditions lawsuit); Coleman v. Wilson, 933 F. Supp. 954 (E.D. Cal. 1996)
(same).
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"Michigan Decisions") striking down certain provisions of the
Act as unconstitutional." In contrast, the Southern District of
New York recently upheld one of the provisions of the Act as
constitutional.6 9 On August 26, 1997, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit afirmed the opinion of the Southern District of New York with respect to the separation of powers
doctrine.70

1. The Michigan Decisions
In three decisions involving two different consent decrees,
the Eastern and Western Districts of Michigan struck down
the stay provisions of the PLRA as unconstitutional.7 All
three opinions, Hadix-Eastern District I, Hadix-Western District, and United States v. Michigan, addressed the narrow

issue of whether prospective relief should be stayed pending
the outcome of a final determination as to whether the court

should terminate the consent decrees.

2

In a later decision of

' Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Hadix v. Johnson,
933 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362 (W.D.
Mich. 1996); United States v. Michigan, No. 1:84 CV 63 (W.D. Mich. July 3, 1996).
' Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd in part, reu'd
in part, No. 96-7957 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997).
" Benjamin v. Jacobson, No. 96-7957 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997). The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the relevant provisions of the Act
were constitutional under the separation of powers doctrine. The court, however,
disagreed that the PLRA required vacatur of the consent decree. Benjamin, No.
96-7957, slip op. at 3. The Second Circuit's decision is discussed more fully infra
note 139.
7 See Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (Feikens, J.)
[hereinafter Hadix-Eastern District 1]; Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362 (W.D.
Mich. 1996, (Enslen, J.) [hereinafter Hadiz:.Western District]; United States v.
ichigan, No. 1:84 CV 63 (W.D. Mich. July 3, 1996) (Enslen, J.). The consent decree at issue in the Hadix litigations, involving conditions at a ,fichigan prison,
was split between the Eastern and Western Districts of Michigan: The Hadix-Western District case covered medical and mental health care and access to the courts,
Hadix-Western District, 933 F. Supp. at 1364, and the Hadix.Eastern District I
case covered the remaining areas including sanitation, fire safety, overcrowding
and protection from harm, volunteers, food service, management, operations, mail,
compliance, and inspection. Hadix-Eastern District I, 933 F. Supp. at 1360. The
transfer was entered by stipulation of the parties and under order of the Sixth
Circuit. Id. at 1360 n.1. The other consent decree, at issue in Unitcd States v.
Michigan, covered areas, similar to the Hadix litigations, at separate prison facilities. United States v. Michigan, No. 1:84 CV 63, slip op. at 1-2.
72 Hadix-Eastern District I, 933 F. Supp. at 1361; Hadix.Western District, 933
F. Supp. at 1365; United States v. Michigan, No. 1:84 CV 63, slip op. at 17.
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the Eastern District of Michigan in the Hadix litigation, the
court struck down the automatic termination provision of the
PLRA as unconstitutional.73 The two consent decrees in the
Michigan Decisions covered similar areas.74
a. Hadix-Western District
The complaint, which culminated in the consent decree at
issue in the Hadix litigations, was filed in 1980 and alleged
violations of the First, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." The claims were
resolved by a consent decree approved by Judge Feikens of the
Eastern District of Michigan.76 By order of the Sixth Circuit,
the areas covered by the Hadix consent decree were split between the Eastern and Western Districts of Michigan." The
Western District retained control over the parts of the consent
decree dealing with medical and mental health care and access
to the courts.78
In Hadix-Western District, Chief Judge Richard A. Enslen
noted the enormous practical constraint the stay provision of
the PLRA puts on the district court.79 The court found that,
given the thirty day limitation imposed by the stay provision,
it is a particularly daunting task to determine whether each of
the numerous orders given since the approval of the consent
decree in 1985 complied with the requirements of the Act.8"
Citing the complexity of the issues involved, the court determined that it would be impossible to come to a final decision
on the termination of the consent decree before the stay would
automatically go into effect.8"
" Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (Feikens, J.) [hereinafter Hadix-Eastern District II].
See supra note 71.
Hadix-Western District, 933 F. Supp. 1362, 1364 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
76 Id.

Hadix-Eastern District 1, 933 F. Supp. 1360, 1360 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
District, 933 F. Supp. at 1364.
79 id.
8 Id. The Act requires that the "relief remains necessary to correct a current
or ongoing violation of a Federal right; that any such relief extends no further
than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right; that it is narrowly
drawn; and [that it] is the least intrusive means to correct the violation." Id. See
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997)
" Hadix-Western District, 933 F. Supp. at 1364 (noting also that the stay
77

78 Hadix-Western
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Before reaching the constitutional arguments against the
PLRA, Chief Judge Enslen first considered the only non-constitutional argument presented-namely, that the PLBA is superseded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' The Rules
Enabling Act ("REA7) grants to the Supreme Court the power
to prescribe rules of practice and procedure.' The REA provides, inter alia, that any law "in conflict with such rules shall
be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken
effect."' The plaintiffs in Hadix-Western District argued that
the PLRA was in conflict with Rule 60(b), which provides for a
motion for relief from judgment "upon such terms as are just,"
and Rule 62(b), which provides for a stay of a judgment at the
trial court's discretion.'

Chief Judge Enslen rejected the

plaintiffs' argument because he found that the PLRA was not
in direct conflict with either rule.' The enforcement of the
stay provision did not affect a court's independent authority to
grant relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) or to grant a stay
in the court's discretion under Rule 62(b).'
The court then turned its attention to the constitutional
arguments against the PLRA. The court held that the stay
provision encroached upon the power of the judiciary, and was
thus in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. 3 According to Chief Judge Enslen, through the stay provision of
the PLRA, "Congress automatically grants the movants relief,
albeit temporarily,
with no provision for a case by case deter"9
mination. '

would go into effect before the parties finished the briefing schedule required by

local court rules).
Id. at 1365. A court must consider non-constitutional grounds for invalidating
a statute before reaching constitutional grounds. Id. (citing Jean v. Nelson, 472
U.S. 846, 854 (1985)).
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994). Pursuant to the REA, the Court adopted

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937.
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994).
"Hadix-Western District, 933 F. Supp. at 1365 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b);
62(b)).

"Id. (citing Griffith Co. v. N.L.R.B, 545 F.2d 1194, 1197 n.3 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, Waggoner v. Griffith Co., 434 U.S. 854 (1977)).
87 Id.
Id. at 1366-67.
8' Id. at 1366.
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The court distinguished a provision of the bankruptcy
code, where Congress can provide an automatic stay." The
court reasoned that since 11 U.S.C. § 362, which provides for
an automatic stay against a debtor upon filing of a bankruptcy
petition, preserves the status quo and the stay provision of the
PLRA reverses the status quo, the two provisions are distinguishable.9 The stay at issue in the bankruptcy code does not
alter the situation affecting the debtor. Conversely, the stay at
issue in the PLRA does alter the situation affecting prisons
being operated under a consent decree. Additionally, the court
noted that the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution92 "gives
Congress special powers to legislate in the area of bankruptcy
law. 93
Chief Judge Enslen also held that the PLRA violated the
doctrine of separation of powers as recently enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.9' The Court
in Plaut held that Congress lacks the power to retroactively
mandate the reopening of a final judgment of an Article III
court. 5 In Plaut, the Court limited its holding to "final judgments wherein the right to appeal has been exhausted, waived
or elapsed." 6
Chief Judge Enslen applied this rule to the PLRA by virtue of another Supreme Court case: Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail.97 In Rufo, the Supreme Court held that a consent
decree, which in some respects is contractual in nature, "is
subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments
and decrees."98 According to Chief Judge Enslen, "[olne of
those rules is the rule relating to finality of judgments."9
Since the parties waived the right to appeal the consent decree, the judgment by which it was entered is final within the

" Hadix-Western District, 933 F. Supp. at 1367 n.3 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362
(1994)).
91 Id.

9'
"

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Hadix-Western District, 933 F. Supp. at 1367 n.3.
Id. at 1367 (citing 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995)).
Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1453.
Hadix-Western District, 933 F. Supp at 1368 (citing Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at

1457).
502 U.S. 367 (1992).
90 Id.

at 378.

Hadix-Western District, 933 F. Supp at 1368.
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meaning of the Supreme Court in Plaut.'" The court rejected
defendants' argument that a consent decree is not a final judgment.1 ' Because the rights involved in a prison consent decree are constitutional in nature, and thus private, the court in
Hadix-Western District held that the decision in Wheeling
Bridge was distinguishable.' °
b. United States v. Michigan
In United States v. Michigan, Chief Judge Enslen came to
the same conclusions as he did in Hadix-Western District. The
consent decree in United States v. Michigan allowed partial
termination upon a finding that a particular violation has been
corrected; the court was forced to address whether such was
the case before considering the effect of the PLRA. 0 3 The outcome of United States v. Michigan illustrates that the federal
courts already have the power to terminate a consent decree
when the violations complained of are corrected."' In addition to striking down the stay provision as unconstitutional,
the court also struck from the consent decree several provisions that had been remedied." 5 The court determined, based
upon stipulation of the parties and the report of an "independent expert," that provisions regarding "sanitation, safety and
hygiene, fire safety, crowding and protection from harm, access
to the courts, and legal mail" should be deleted from the consent decree.' A provision governing the "placing of high-risk
100Id.
.01
Id. That argument was based upon the 1855 Supreme Court decision in
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., which held that Congress can
retroactively modify the prospective effect of injunctive relief where public rights
common to all are at stake. 59 U.S. 421, 431 (1856).
Hadix-Western District, 933 F. Supp. 1368. The court also struck down the
stay provision on due process grounds. Id. at 1369. That argument is beyond the
scope of this note.
"0 United States v. Michigan, No. 1:84 CV 63, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Mich. 1996)
(noting that 'the Court reviews compliance under the [consent decree] and deletes
provisions where it finds compliance" and that 'the Court considers motions relative to provisions with which defendants have not complied, including arguments
that full compliance is not necessary based on relevant constitutional standards").
The Hadix consent decree, however, required compliance with all provisions prior
to termination. Id.
104 See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 380 (1992).
1
United States v. Michigan, No. 1:84 CV 63, slip op. at 3-4.
106 Id. at 4.
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prisoners with prisoners in lower [risk] classifications and in
settings that do not meet the defendants' own standards for
their secure confinement" was not terminated pursuant to the
court's own authority to modify the consent decree.0 7 The
court was concerned about the continuing violation of that
requirement and its fear that the defendants could not maintain compliance with it.'0 8
Consistent with his decision in Hadix-Western District,
Chief Judge Enslen found that there was "no possible way the
Court could decide the motion to terminate the Consent Decree" before the stay provision was to take effect in thirty days,
pursuant to section 3626(e)."0 9 The remainder of his opinion
in United States v. Michigan is nearly identical to his opinion
in Hadix-Western District.Accordingly, the court came to the
same conclusions as were made in Hadix-Western District:the
stay provision of the PLRA was not superseded by Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) and 62(b); 0 the provision encroached upon the powers of the judiciary in violation of separation of powers;"' it altered a final judgment of an Article
III court;" and finally, it violated the due process clause."'
c. Hadix Eastern District I
Judge John Feikens of the Eastern District of Michigan
approved the consent decree at issue in the Hadix litigations in
1985." In 1992 and 1993 certain areas covered by the consent decree were transferred to the Western District of Michigan leaving the following areas behind to be administered by
the Eastern District: "Sanitation; Safety and Health; . . . Fire

Safety; Overcrowding... ; Volunteers;... Food Service; Man-

107

Id.

108 Id.
'o
110

United States v. Michigan, No. 1:84 CV 63, slip op. at 6.
Id.

at 7-9.

...Id. at 9-12.
1,,Id.

at 12-16.

Id.

at 16-17.

"
1

Hadix-Western District, 933 F. Supp. at 1364.
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agement; Operations; Mail; Compliance; and Inspection." 5 '
In Hadix Eastern District I, Judge Feikens struck down the
stay provision of the PLRA as violative of separation of powers
and due process."'
The court noted that staying the consent decree could have
profound effects. 1 Judge Feikens explained that the prison
was undergoing major structural and organizational changes
as a result of the consent decree.' He further observed that
although it was reasonable to assume that the project would
not be suspended as a result of the motion to stay, the defendants did have the power to request such relief under the
PLRA."' The court rejected the use of the All Writs Act,' °
which enables a court to " 'preserve [its] jurisdiction or maintain the status quo' pending the questions before it.""1 The
court found it unnecessary to resort to using the All Writs Act,
as the stay provision was a "palpable constitutional violation in
which Congress takes over a court's docket and intrudes on a
court's final judgment.... ."

Instead of discussing the pre-

cedent that led to the court's conclusion that the stay provision
of the PLRA was unconstitutional, the court incorporated by
reference the decision in Hadix-WesternDistrict.'
d. Hadix-EasternDistrictH
In November 1996, Judge Feikens issued a second opinion
in the Hadix case, striking down the automatic termination
provision of the PLRA in Hadix-Eastern District ff.' Although the plaintiffs argued that the provision also violated
1

Hadix-Eastern District I, 933 F. Supp. at 1360.

Id. at 1361-62.
, Id. at 1361.
116

118 Id.
119 Id.
12

28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994).

Hadix-Eastern District I, 933 F. Supp. at 1361 (quoting Arrow Transp. Col.
v. Southern Ry. Co., 372 U.S. 658, 671 n.22 (1963)). The All Writs Act provides:
"The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable
to the usages and principles of law." Hadix.Eastern District I, 933 F. Supp. at
1361 n.3 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)).
Hadix-Eastern District I, 933 F. Supp. at 1361.
Id. at 1361-62.
,' 947 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
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equal protection and due process, the court limited its discussion to separation of powers doctrine. Before addressing the
PLRA directly, the court first made it clear that the purpose of
the consent decree was to ensure the constitutionality of confinement." Although the consent decree settled the dispute
between the parties, Judge Feikens noted that it would "be imto conclude . . . that no constitutional violations exproper
26
ist."
The court first addressed the standard for modification of
a consent decree in institutional reform cases as recently enunciated by the Supreme Court in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk
The Court in Rufo cited three situations
County Jail.'
where modification is proper: "1) when changed factual conditions make compliance with the decree substantially more
onerous; 2) when a decree proves to be unworkable because of
unforeseen obstacles; or 3) when enforcement of the decree
without modification would be detrimental to the public interest."'" The Court held that the proposed modification should
conform to the change in circumstances and not be rewritten
so that it conforms to the constitutional floor. 29 Such is required "for a consent decree is a final judgment that may be
reopened only to the extent that equity requires."130 According to Judge Feikens, the Rufo standard for modification of a
consent decree is a balancing of competing public and private
interests:
The public's right in maintaining control over its institutions is
protected through modification of a consent decree when a change in
circumstances so requires. The parties' right to rely on a court order
is protected by the limitation precluding a court, or Congress, from
stripping a consent decree to the constitutional floor.'

12

Id. at 1103.

126

id.

at 1104 (citing 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992)). Rufo is discussed more fully
infra notes 191-219 and accompanying text.
12 Rufo, 502 U.S. at 384.
127 Id.

129 Id.
130 Id.
131

at 391.

Hadix-Eastern District II, 947 F. Supp. at 1107.
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Turning its attention to the PLRA, the court in Hadix-Eastern
District11 took issue with the Act's use of the term "prospective relief."'32 Injunctive relief, according to Judge Feikens,
"affects conditions as they arise. Past injunctive relief cannot
be changed as time cannot be turned back"' The court reasoned that it is not prospective relief that is being altered, but
rather it is the consent judgment itself.'
Having first resolved the issue of finality of a consent
decree by applying Rufo, Judge Feikens then held that the rule
of Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. was fully applicable to the
automatic termination provision of the PLRA.' In addition
to striking down the automatic termination provision as violative of separation of powers, the court denied termination pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60." Because the
defendant prison officials had not yet fully complied with an
alternate plan of compliance, the court held that termination
"upon such terms as are just"' 7 was not proper.ns

Id. at 1109.
13 Id.
" Id.
But see Benjamin v. Jacobson, No. 96-7957 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997)
(avoiding constitutional problems by interpreting 'prospective relief* as the relief

contained in the consent decree and not as the consent decree itself); Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 952 F. Supp. 869 (D. Mass. 1997)
(same).
Hadix Eastern District II, 947 F. Supp. at 1109-10.
Id. at 1112-13.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b).
Hadix-Eastern District II, 947 F. Supp. at 1113.
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2. Benjamin v. Jacobson'39
In Benjamin v. Jacobson, Judge Harold Baer, Jr. of the
Southern District of New York upheld the automatic termination provision of the PLRA as constitutional. 40 Judge Baer
rejected plaintiffs' contentions that the automatic termination

The discussion in the text of Benjamin v. Jacobson is based on the district
court's opinion in the case. See 935 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The Second
Circuit delivered its opinion on August 26, 1997, just days prior to this Note going
to press. Production requirements made it impossible to fully analyze this recent
opinion of the Second Circuit. The following brief discussion is included here to
help the reader understand some of the differences between the district court's
opinion and the opinion of the Second Circuit. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, No. 967957 (2d Cir Aug 26, 1997).
As discussed more fully in the text, the district court upheld the automatic
termination provision of the PLRA on separation of powers grounds and ordered
that the consent decrees be vacated. Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 357. The Second
Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision with respect to separation of powers,
but reversed the court on the issue of vacating the consent decree. Benjamin, No.
96-7957, slip op. at 3.
To avoid striking down the Act, the Second Circuit followed the often cited
rule that a court should adopt a construction of a statute "to avoid constitutional
questions whenever such a construction is 'fairly possible' ". Id. at 11 (citing
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). The ambiguity in the statute,
according to the Second Circuit, comes from the term "prospective relief." See 18
U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997). The text of § 3626(b)(2) is included supra
note 10.
The termination of prospective relief provided for under § 3626(b)(2) is subject
to two different interpretations:
If "prospective relief" includes the past [consent decrees] themselves, then
these are terminated and anulled under the law. If, instead, 'termination
of prospective relief means that no future relief-that is neither future
enforcement nor articulation-is available in federal courts under past
[consent decrees], then the [consent decrees] remain valid, but no longer
subject to federal jurisdiction.
Benjamin, No. 96-7957, slip op. at 8. The Second Circuit adopted the latter
interpretation after analyzing the of the statute. Id. at 9-10.
By interpreting "prospective relief" to mean the relief contained in the consent
decrees and not the consent decrees themselves, the court was able to avoid a
construction that it deemed would raise separation of powers concerns under Plaut
v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995). Benjamin, No. 96-7957, slip op.
at 21. Essentially, the court viewed the provision as merely restricting the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to fashion relief. Id. According to the court, the
plaintiffs are free to seek enforcement of the decrees in state court. Id. at 3. The
court also avoided constitutional concerns under United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 128 (1871), by adopting the same construction of the term "prospective
relief" used to analyze Plaut. Benjamin, No. 96-7957, slip op. at 22-25.
1"0 935 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd in part, rev'd in part, No. 96-7957
(2d Cir. Aug. 26 1997).
13
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provision was superseded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and that the provision violated the doctrine of separation
of powers, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection
Clause.
The first consent decree in Benjamin was issued in 1978,
addressing prison conditions in New York City jails, including
Rikers Island." The consent decrees covered areas such as
environmental health and safety concerns and overcrowding.' The City claimed that the consent decrees amounted
to micro-management by the federal courts of state institutions. The court noted in response that "each consent decree by
definition required [the city's] imprimatur.""'
The parties in Benjamin disagreed about the effectiveness
of the consent decrees in remedying alleged constitutional
violations. Despite claims by the City that allegations of
Eighth Amendment violations were never proven, John Boston,
the plaintiffs' attorney, noted that constitutional violations
were found with respect to "protracted confinement in receiving rooms and overcrowding."'" Mr. Boston alleged that the
City was in contempt of the consent decrees and that in response, the City created the Office of Compliance Consultants

..Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 342.
2 I& The consent decrees at issue in Benjamin u. Jacobson were the result of
a settlement agreement after a trial was conducted in 1976-77 in the case of Benjamin v. Malcolm. Id. at 342.
" Id Michael F. Jacobson, Commissioner of the Department of Correction, suggested that the city was "coerced into signing the Consent Decrees [by] . .. 'court
ordered' stipulations.&" Id. The court also noted that New York never accepted the
offer by former Attorney General William Barr to use his office to be relieved
from the burdens of such consent decrees as had Texas, Michigan, and Philadelphia. Id. (citing Overhauling the Nations' Prisons, supra note 2 (statement of WilH1am Barr)).
1" Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 342 (citing Benjamin v. Sielaff, 752 F. Supp. 140
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Benjamin v. Malcolm, 564 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). Benjamin v. Sielaff and Benjamin v. Malcolm were two of several decisions by the court
involving the consent decree at issue in Benjamin v. Jacobson. See also Benjamin
v. Jacobson, 923 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (modifying consent decree to restrict
access to prison library because of excessive violence); Benjamin v. Jacobson, No.
75 Civ. 3073, 1995 WL 681297 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 1995) (modifying consent decree
in the area of food service); Benjamin v. Malcolm, No. 75 Civ. 3073, 1995 WL
378529 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1995) (modifying consent decree to restrict the wearing
of jewelry associated with gangs); Benjamin v. Koehler, 710 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (denying modification of consent decree to increase the number of detainees
in certain facilities).
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("0CC") to monitor the consent decrees.14 5 Moreover, even
after the creation of the OCC, the city was cited for noncompliance with the consent decrees.146 In response, Commissioner
Michael Jacobson of the Department of Corrections asserted
that the City had responded to the alleged noncompliance by
improving sanitation, maintenance and fire safety.147 Before
the court decided to vacate the consent decrees, Judge Baer
noted:
Stripped of hyperbole and taking history into account, the Declarations [of the parties] suggest federal court oversight of prison condi[Tihe challenge is for the City and the
tions was valuable ....
Board of Correction to be vigilant and attentive to those [constitutional] guarantees."'

Before considering the PLRA's constitutionality, the court
in Benjamin reviewed the history of reform in prison conditions since colonial times.149 At the conclusion of this somewhat lengthy review, the court noted that what was truly important was not the constitutionality of the Act, but rather the
effect on prisoners' rights and prison conditions as a result of
the PLRA."50 By its own admission, the court's "concerns with
this new legislation [were] myriad," but it was "constrained
under the law to uphold it."'

Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 342.
Id. at 342 (citing Benjamin v. Sielaff, 752 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)). In
a report by the OCC in February 1996, non-compliance was evidenced in the areas
of "fire safety, maintenance, and sanitation." Id.
1

14

'47

Id. at 343.

18 Id.

149 Id.

at 338-40.
935 F. Supp. at 340. This portion of the opinion is quite curious.
The court documented horrible prison conditions throughout this nation's history
and accredited (in part) the use of consent decrees in reforming prisons and bringing them up to constitutional muster. Id. at 338-40.
...
Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 337 (noting that " 'It is not within [the court's]
authority to determine whether... congressional judgment .. . is sound or equiOur concern here, as often, is with power, not with wisdom.' ")
table ....
(quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960)). See also Deborah Pines,
City Freed of Consent Decrees on Jails, N.Y.L.J., July 24, 1996, at 1 (in describing
the decision in Benjamin, the author describes the decision of Judge Baer as 'reluctant").
1.. Benjamin,
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Judge Baer refused to address the constitutionality of §
802 of the PLRA as a whole, 2 considering only the Act's requirements for prospective relief' and the automatic termination provision.' By deciding the defendants' motion to terminate the consent decree before the stay provision was to go
into effect (30 days after filing of the motion), the court avoided
passing on the constitutionality of the stay provision.' The
court referred to two of the Michigan Decisions,' and while
purportedly sharing
concerns expressed therein, nevertheless
15 7
upheld the Act.

'52

Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 343 (noting that defendants based their motion

solely on the automatic termination provisions of the PLRA, sce 18 US.C.A.
§ 3626(b)(2) (West Supp. 1994), and that the Court would only consider that section along with the more general sections involved, since those were the only sections properly before the court). See 18 U.S.CA. § 3626(a)(1); (bX3).
1 See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a)(1). See also supra note 10.
"' See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(1); (b)(2). See also supra note 10.
15 See 18 U.S.C-.A § 3626(e). See also supra note 10. By agreement of the
parties, the court extended the date upon which the stay provision was to go into
effect for an additional thirty days so that the United States would have "additional time to submit a memorandum of law on the constitutionality of the Act."
Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 358 n.21. The stay provision, 18 US.C.A. § 3626(e)(2),
does not provide the court with such discretion. That section provides: 'Any prospective relief subject to a pending motion shall be automatically stayed during
the period... beginning on the 30th day after such motion is filed." The Court
asserted that the stay provision was not before it because it 'disposed of [the]
motion within the requisite time period." Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 358. This is
contrary to the plain language of the statute, and therefore, the Court should have
decided whether the stay provision is constitutional.
" Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 358 (citing Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1360
(E.D. Mich. 1996); United States v. Michigan, No. 1:84 CV 63 (W.D. Mich. July 3,
1996)).
" Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 358. Curiously, the court did not elaborate on
what concerns it shared with those opinions. Those courts considered the same
precedents as the court in Benjamin, in striking down the stay provision, that the
court in Benjamin used in upholding the automatic termination provision. Compare, e.g., Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (citing
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856), for
the proposition that the distinction between public and private rights is crucial in
determining whether or not Congress has the power to modify a final judgment),
with Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 348 (distinguishing Wheeing Bridge and holding
the distinction between public and private rights irrelevant in separation of powers
analysis). For a discussion of Wheeling Bridge see infra notes 225-35 and accompanying text.
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The court quickly raised and disposed of the only nonconstitutional.. argument raised to challenge the PLRA: that
it violated the REA. 5 ' The plaintiffs argued 6 that the
automatic termination provision of the PLRA is in direct conflict with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which provides
for a reconsideration of a final judgment "upon such terms as
are just."6 ' The plaintiffs also argued that the stay provision
of the PLRA was in direct conflict with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 62(b), which provides that the stay of a final judgment is in the court's discretion.'62 Since the court
avoided"es the stay provision in its analysis, it was not necessary to consider plaintiffs' argument with respect to Rule 62(b).
The court held that the automatic termination provision of the
PLRA was not in direct conflict with Rule 60(b)."6 The PLRA
merely provides "an alternative mechanism that parties may
utilize to modify a final judgment.""6
In contrast to the courts in the Michigan Decisions, the
court in Benjamin concluded that the Act did not violate the
doctrine of separation of powers. 66 In reaching that conclusion, Judge Baer relied upon the 1856 Supreme Court decision
in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge.6 Judge Baer

' " 'Only when a non-constitutional basis on which a decision may be made
cannot be found should the Court reach any constitutional questions.' " Benjamin,
935 F. Supp. at 343 (quoting Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985)).
...28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994). The REA is discussed more fully supra notes 82-87
and accompanying text.
1"0 Plaintiffs' Memo in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Vacate the Consent
Decrees at 67-69, Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (75 Civ.
3073).
161 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
16 Plaintiffs' Memo in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Vacate the Consent
Decrees at 67-9, Benjamin (75 Civ. 3073).
, See supra notes 152-155 and accompanying text.
I Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 344. The Second Circuit did not address the REA
on appeal. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, No. 96-7957 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997).
"6Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 344. See also Gavin v. Ray, Civ. No. 4-78-CV70062, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 18, 1996) (holding that the PLRA does not
violate the REA), reu'd on other grounds, Gavin v. Branstad, Nos. 96-3746, 963748, 1997 WL 434633 (8th Cir. Aug. 5, 1997)); Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp.
1362, 1365 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (same); United States v. Michigan, No. 1:84 CV 63,
slip op. at 8 (W.D. Mich. July 3, 1996) (same).
1
Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 344-52. The court also upheld the Act on due
process and equal protection grounds. Those arguments are beyond the scope of
this note.
167 Id. at 345 (citing 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856)).
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held that the rule of Plaut was inapplicable to the PLEA because the Plaut decision only prohibits Congress from reopening final judgments."s According to Judge Baer, a consent
decree is not a final judgment, subject to the rule of Plaut,
because it is an injunction that is equitable in nature."°
In Wheeling Bridge, the Supreme Court held that Congress
was acting within its enumerated powers when it passed legislation contravening a previous decision of the Supreme
Court.'70 As understood by the court in Benjamin, the decision in Wheeling Bridge turned upon the equitable nature of
the remedy involved.'7 In support of this assertion, the court
in Benjamin relied upon the "historic power of a court of equity
to modify its decree in light of changed circumstances.""'
Judge Baer rejected plaintiffs' contention that Wheeling Bridge
is distinguishable from the consent decrees in Benjamin because the underlying rights involved in Wheeling Bridge were
public in nature while the rights involved in Benjamin were
private.' 3 The court held that the dispositive issue was the
nature of the remedy involved-an equitable injunction as opposed to a remedy at law-and not the nature of the underlying rights-private as opposed to public.' 4
The court then rejected plaintiffs' argument that the PLRA
violates the rule of United States v. Klein that a congressional
act prescribing a rule of decision violates separation of powers.'75 The court rejected plaintiffs' contention because it determined that the PLRA "did change the law governing the district courts' remedial powers." As the PLRA effected a
change in law rather than commanded a finding under existing
law, Judge Baer held that the rule of lein had not been violated. 77 After dispensing with the statutory and constitution-

1S Id.
U2

Id.

170 Id.

at 344-45.
at 345.

at 345 (citing Wheeling Bridge, 59 U.S. at 431).

Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 345.
172 Id. at 346 (citing United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932); WRIGHT
1

ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2863 at 336 (2d ed. 1995)).
173

Id. at 347.

174 Id. at 348-49.
175

Id. at 349 (citing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wal) 128 (1871)).

176 Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 350.
17 Id. The court rejected a number

beyond the scope of this note.

of other constitutional arguments which are
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al arguments, the court held that immediate termination was
proper because the findings required by the Act' "were not
made when the Consent Decrees were enacted in 1978-1979..
"179

II. ANALYSIS: THE PLRA UNCONSTTUTIONALLY VIOLATES THE
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS

Through the PLRA, Congress has unconstitutionally mandated the reopening of final judgments of Article III courts18
and prescribed a rule of decision... in violation of the doctrine
of separation of powers. This doctrine, evident in the writings
of the Framers, was embodied in our Constitution through the
creation of three separate coordinate branches of government,
each with its own distinct enumerated powers. "2 As early as
1792, the power of the federal judiciary was recognized as a
power separate and distinct from the executive and legislative
powers." The 1995 Supreme Court decision in Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc. established the rule that Congress
cannot reopen a final judgment of an Article III court without
violating the doctrine of separation of powers.' 4 Thus, insofar as a consent decree, approved by a federal court to resolve
a prison conditions lawsuit, is considered a final judgment,"

, 18 U.S.CAL § 3626(b)(2) requires:
immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved
or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is
narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to
correct the violation of the Federal right.
18 U.S.CJA. § 3626(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997).
...
Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 357. Although upholding the district court's opinion on separation of powers grounds under both Plaut and Klein, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision to vacate the consent decrees. Benjamin
v. Jacobson, No 96-7957, (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997). The Second Circuit opinion is
briefly discussed supra note 139.
2
See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
, See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 128 (1871).
182 Hadix-Western District, 933 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (citing
Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57 (1982)).
18 See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
18

Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1447.

18

See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
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the automatic termination" s and stay' provisions of the
PLRA violate the rule set forth in Plaut by retroactively commanding a federal court to reopen a final decision and terminate relief if such relief was granted without the findings required by the Act."s
The automatic termination and stay provisions of the
PLRA violate another long standing aspect of the doctrine of
separation of powers. In 1871, the Supreme Court, in United
States v. lein, established the rule that Congress may not
prescribe a rule of decision in cases pending before the federal
courts without a change in conditions or without changing the
underlying substantive law."s These provisions of the PLRA
reflect a change in court procedure that the courts must conform to before granting prospective relief. They command the
district court to come to a certain result-termination of the
consent decree-not by changing the underlying substantive
law or by recognizing changing conditions within the prison,
but rather by changing the rules of court procedure. This Congress cannot do without violating separation of powers as interpreted by the Court in Klein.
A. A Consent Decree is a FinalJudgment
A consent decree, like any other judgment of an Article HI
court, becomes a final judgment subject to the rule set forth in
Plaut once the ability to appeal has expired.' The Supreme
9 ' had a
Court, in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,"
chance to consider the finality of consent decrees in the context
of whether a prison condition consent decree could be modified.
In Rufo, the parties settled a 1971 inmate complaint, alleging
unconstitutional prison conditions at a pre-trial detention facility known as the Charles Street Jail, by entering into a district

19

18 U.S.C-A

§ 3626(b).

" 18 U.S.CA § 3626(e)(2).
11 See 18 U.S.C-.A § 3626(a). The PLRA requires certain findings by the district court before it grants prospective relief. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the findings required by the Act

*' 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 128 (1871).
11

Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1457.
502 U.S. 367 (1992).
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court approved consent decree in 1979.19' Prior to the approval of the consent decree, the court found that the conditions at
the Charles Street Jail violated the Due Process Clause and
enjoined prison officials from housing more than one pre-trial
detainee in a single cell ("double celling") after November 1973
and also enjoined the housing of all pre-trial detainees at the
facility after June 1976.93 With the problems of the jail still
unresolved by 1978, the First Circuit ordered the facility closed
by October 1978.""4 Four days before that deadline, prison
officials settled with the inmates and agreed to enter into a
consent decree, which provided that the Charles Street Jail
could remain open until the completion of a new facility that
complied with constitutional requirements.'95
In 1989, with construction not yet complete on the new
facility and already six years behind schedule, prison officials
moved for modification of the consent decree to allow double
celling in a portion of the new prison to meet population demands.19 Officials argued that changes in fact (i.e., an unexpected increase in the pre-trial detainee population) and
changes in law (i.e., the Supreme Court decision in Bell v.
Wolfish,'9 7 holding that double celling was not per se unconstitutional) required the court to modify the consent decree to
allow double celling'9
Before setting forth the standard for modification of a
consent decree in institutional reform litigation, the Court in
Rufo first discussed the nature of a judgment entered into by
consent of the parties:
A consent decree no doubt embodies an agreement of the parties and

thus in some respects is contractual in nature. But it is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be
enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally
applicable to other judgments and decrees."'

"2

Id.

at 372-75.

19 Id. at 373 (citing Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp.
676, 691 (D. Mass. 1973)).
' Id. at 374 (citing Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 573 F.2d 98,
99-100 (1st Cir. 1978)).
19 Id.
191 Rufo,
"7
"'
"'

502 U.S. at 376.
441 U.S. 520 (1979).
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 376.
Id. at 378 (citing System Federation No. 91, Railway Employees Department,
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The Court held that the consent decree could not be modified
by the courts absent the showing of a grievous wrong." The
Rufo Court also held that the district court had misapplied the
often quoted "grievous wrong" standard as set forth in United
States v. Swift & Co.2 ' That standard provides that "nothing
less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and
unforeseen conditions" could be the predicate for modification
of a consent decree." 2 The Swift Court, however, distinguished the facts of its case from other cases in which genuine
The
changes required modification of a consent decree.'
Court in Swift noted, "the consent is to be read as directed
toward events as they then were. It was not an abandonment
of the right to exact revision in the future, if revision should
become necessary in adaptation to events to be."' The Court
in Rufo further noted that it is essential in institutional reform
cases that the terms of a consent decree be modified by the
courts where changing conditions warrant such a modification."5 The decision in Rufo was made entirely within the
context of a court's ability to modify its own decision under the
authority of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). Rule
60(b)(5) enables a party to seek modification of a final decision
when "'it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have

AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1961)).
200 Id. at 379.
o Id. (citing United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)).
2-2 Swift, 286 U.S. at 119.
2" Id. at 114-15. What is clear from Swift is that the power of a court to mcdifr a consent decree is self evident where circumstances or the underlying sub3tantive law has changed. What is not clear from Swift is whether Congress has the
power to order a court to modify a consent decree, based not on a change in circumstances or the underlying substantive law, but rather based on a change in
procedure. That issue was simply not before the Court in Swift. One can infer,
however, that a change in the procedure is not the equivalent of a change in
conditions or in the underlying substantive law. See akso New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 967 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 915 (1983) (citing Swift, 286 U.S. at 114) (noting that the fact that Justice Cardozo was dealing with a consent decree and not a judgment as a result of
litigation in Swift was not dispositive of whether injunctive relief should be modified).
20 Swift, 286 U.S. at 115.
Rufo, 502 U.S. at 380 (noting the upsurge in institutional reform litigation
since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 US. 483 (1954), and the need to modify
consent decrees that remain in force for extended periods of time).
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prospective application ....
n06 Modification is not proper
under that rule where a party merely determines that it is "no
longer 7convenient to live with the terms of a consent de20
cree."
According to the Court in Rufo, modification of a consent
decree in a prison condition lawsuit is proper "1) when changed
factual conditions make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous; 2) when a decree proves to be unworkable
because of unforeseen obstacles; or 3) when enforcement of the
decree without modification would be detrimental to the public
interest."2 8 Ultimately, the Court remanded the case to determine whether changing circumstances warranted modification of the consent decree.0 9
The Court in Rufo also considered the effect upon a consent decree of a change in substantive statutory or decisional
law.210 The Court first discussed System Federation No. 91,
Railway Employees Department v. Wright,
which involved a
consent decree prohibiting discrimination against nonunion
employees. The Court in Wright allowed modification of a consent decree, when the underlying substantive law was changed
to make 1legal
(union shops) what the decree was designed to
22
prevent.
The Court in Rufo then turned its attention to petitioner's
argument that the Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. Wolfish211 was a change in the underlying substantive law, and
required a modification of the consent decree.2 4 In Bell, the
Court held that double celling in prisons was not per se unconstitutional. 2 " The Court in Rufo reasoned that since Bell was
pending when the consent decree at issue in Rufo was signed,
it was "immaterial to petitioners that double celling might be

26 Id.
217Id.

at 383 (quoting Fed R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5)).
at 383.
206 Id. at 384.
219Id. at 393.
210 Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388-90.
211 364 U.S. 642 (1961).
212 Id. at 651.
213 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
214 Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388.
2" Bell, 441 U.S. at 541.
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ruled constitutional, i.e., they preferred even in that event to
agree to a decree which called for providing only single cells in
the jail to be built."'
After discussing Wright and rejecting petitioner's argument based on Bell, the Rufo Court noted:
To hold that a clarification in the law automatically opens the door

for relitigation of the merits of every affected consent decree would
undermine the finality of such agreements and could serve as a

disincentive to negotiation of settlements in institutional reform
litigation. 17

Although the decision in Rufo concerned the ability of a
court to modify a consent decree based upon a change in the
underlying circumstances or a change in the underlying substantive law upon which the consent decree was fashioned, the
case is illustrative of the Supreme Court's view that a consent
decree is in fact a final judgment similar to any other judgment of a court.2 1 Even in a situation where modification is
required by a change in constitutional standards, the Rufo
Court noted:
A proposed modification should not strive to rewrite a consent decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor. Once a court has
determined that changed circumstances warrant a modification in a

consent decree, the focus should be on whether the proposed modification is tailored to resolve the problems created by the change in
circumstances. A court should do no more, for a consent decree is a
final judgment that may be reopened only to the extent that equity
requires.219
In Hadix-Western District and United States v. Michigan,
Judge Enslen held that the consent decrees were final
judgments." Noting that the Supreme Court in Rufo had
held that consent decrees are subject to " 'rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees[,]' "he held that "[olne of
these rules is the rule relating to finality of judgments."
216
2"
218

Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388.
Id. at 389 (emphasis added).
See CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE Am PROCEDURE §

4443,

at 384 n.9 (1981) (noting that modification of a consent decree is similar to modification of a litigated decree).
2 9 Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391 (emphasis added).
Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (W.D. Mich. 1996); United States
v. Michigan, No. 1:84 CV 63, slip op. at 14 (W.D. Mich. July 3, 1996).
' Hadix-Western District, 933 F. Supp. at 1368 (citing Rufo, 502 U.S. at 378);
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Once all "appeals have been exhausted or the time for appeal
has elapsed or been waived, consent decrees become final judgments."2 Since the parties in both the Hadix-Western District and United States v. Michigan consent decrees were no
longer able to appeal the judgment approving those consent
decrees, Judge Enslen held that the consent decrees were final
and protected from legislative reopening.' In Hadix-Eastern
DistrictII, Judge Feikens held that "Itihe PLRA completely rewrites the standard for modification in prison litigation, making consent decrees subject to the constitutional floor-in direct contrast to Rufo." 4
In holding that a consent decree was not a final judgment,
Judge Baer's decision in Benjamin focused on the Supreme
Court's 1856 decision in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont
Bridge Co.2' The dispute in Wheeling Bridge arose out of an

injunction against the defendant, entered in 1852, requiring
the defendant to remove a bridge that it had constructed over
the Ohio River because the bridge was determined to be "an
obstruction of the free navigation of the.., river... for which
there was no adequate remedy at law."2 26 Later in 1852, Con-

gress passed an act declaring the bridge to be a "lawful structure" and further declaring the bridge to be a post-road.221
The Court in Wheeling Bridge upheld the act of Congress and

United States v. Michigan, No. 1:84 CV 63, slip op. at 14 (same).
'" Id. at 1368 (citing Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561,
590 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring), questioned by Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755
(1989); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 827 (1992)); United States v. Michigan, No. 1:84 CV 63, slip op. at 14
(same).
2"

Hadix-Western District, 933 F. Supp. at 1368-69; United States v. Michigan,

No. 1:84 CV 63, slip op. at 14. Although Judge Feikens, in Hadix-Eastern District,
did not explicitly discuss finality with respect to consent decrees, the previous
discussion is fully attributable to him as well, because he incorporated Judge
Enslen's opinion. See Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1360, 1361-62 (E.D. Mich.
1996) (concurring with Judge Enslen's opinion in Hadix-Western District and incor.
porating it as an appendix).
24

Hadix-Eastern District II, 947 F. Supp. 1100, 1104 (E.D. Mich. 1996).

Benjamin v. Jacobsen, 935 F. Supp. 332, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856), affd in
part, reo'd in part, No. 96-7957 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997)).
' Wheeling Bridge, 59 U.S. at 429.
2-7 Id. (citing 10 Stat. 112 (1852)). By declaring the bridge to be a post-road,
Congress was arguably acting within one of its enumerated powers, see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
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declared the injunction to be of no further force and effect.
In so holding the Court first noted:
[It is urged, that the act of Congress cannot have the effect and
operation to annul the judgment of the court already rendered or the
rights determined thereby in favor of the plaintiffE This, as a general
proposition, is certainly not to be denied, especially as it respects
adjudication upon the private rights of parties. When they have
passed into judgment the right becomes absolute, and it is the duty
of the court to enforce it.'

The Court found this general proposition distinguishable from
the case before it because the rights involved were public in
nature."0 The fact that a private party could maintain an action for public nuisance under state common law did not alter
the fact that any damages or removal would arise "out of the
unlawful interference with the enjoyment of the public right..
S."1 The Court further reasoned that if the remedy had been

an action at law, then Congress2 would not have been able to
alter the decision of the Court.

What is clear from Wheeling Bridge is that, where such a
judgment involves the private rights of the litigants, Congress
has no power to alter a final judgment of an Article III
court.' It also is evident that Congress has no power to alWheeling Bridge, 59 U.S. at 436.
Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
Id. (The bridge's "interference with the free navigation of the river constituted an obstruction of a public right secured by acts of Congres? through its power
to regulate commerce.); cf Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 604 (1923). In Hodges,
the Court applied the rule in Wheeling Bridge to the case of a taxpayer lawsuit to
enjoin the Board of Education from operating a consolidated school district. Id. at
602. During the course of the litigation, the South Dakota legislature passed a law
making the consolidated school district legal Id. The Court held that the act of
the legislature was valid and the injunction was lifted. Id. Although Hodges involved the actions of a state legislature affecting the decisions of a state court, it
is illustrative of the application of the rule in Wheeling Bridge.
21 Wheeling Bridge, 59 U.S. at 431.
Id. This is not obiter dicta. The Courtes award of costs in the prior litigation, based on a remedy at law, were left unaffected by the Court'a decisions respecting the injunction. Id.
Wheeling Bridge remains good law. As recently as 1995, the Supreme Court
has left this decision undisturbed. See Planut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct.
1447, 1459 (1995); see also Mount Graham Coalition v. Thomas, 89 F.3d 554, 557
(9th Cir. 1996). In Thomas, the Ninth Circuit held constitutional, on separation of
powers grounds, an act of Congress, which authorized the construction of a university telescope. Id. at 555. The District Court for the District of Arizona had previously granted an injunction enjoining the construction of the telescope because of
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ter a final judgment, where the judgment is one at law involving public rights, such as the court costs upheld in Wheeling
Bridge. What the Court in Wheeling Bridge did not address, for
the issue was not before it, was whether Congress has the
power to modify an equitable judgment based upon private
rights. Such is the situation with the consent decrees affected
by the PLRA. The rights at stake in these consent decrees are
private rights derived from the Constitution often involving
claims of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment or claims of unlawful detainment in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."4
In holding that Congress had the power to modify the final
judgment at issue in the PLRA, the district court in Benjamin
determined that it was the nature of the remedy, not the nature of the right, which was key in Wheeling Bridge.235 In
reaching that conclusion, the court relied on the" 'historic power of a court of equity to modify its decree in light of changed
circumstances.' "26 This power of modification, codified in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), is inapposite for separation of powers analysis. Rule 60(b)(5) speaks only to the
power of the courts, not Congress, to grant relief from a final

the presence in the area of an endangered red squirrel species. Id. The Ninth
Circuit held that the act of Congress had only prospective effect and thus did not
violate the rule in Plaut. Id. at 556. It further held that because the injunction
here was prospective and involved public rights similar to those involved in Wheeling Bridge, Congress did have the power to alter the effect of the injunction. Id.
at 557.
' Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that
the decision in Wheeling Bridge is distinguishable from the consent decrees at
issue in the PLRA because constitutional rights are private in nature) (citing Rose
v. City of Los Angeles, 814 F. Supp. 878, 881 (C.D. Cal. 1993)); United States v.
Michigan, No. 1:84 CV 63, slip op. at 14 (W.D. Mich. July 3, 1996) (same).
' Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856)), affd
in part, rev'd in part, No. 96-7957 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997).
' Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 346. (citing 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2863, at 336 (2d ed. 1995)). See System Federation No. 91, Railway Employees Department v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932); FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5).
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judgment. One need only to read the remainder of Rule 60 to
see that modification is available in situations wholly unrelated to whether the remedy being altered was equitable in nature. 7
The district court in Benjamin rejected the argument that
private rights guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be legislatively altered."8 The power of Congress to alter statutorily
created rights, public or private, is plenary and beyond question." 9 In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., the Supreme Court, in a bankruptcy decision involving the allocation of power between Article I and Article MII
courts, made it clear that congressional power to modify constitutionally based rights is limited by the doctrine of separation
of powers:
[There is] a critical difference between rights created by federal
statute and rights recognized by the Constitution .... [Sluch a distinction seems to us to be necessary in light of the delicate accommodations required by the principle of separation of powers reflected
in Art. III. The constitutional system of checks and balances is designed to guard against 'encroachment or aggrandizement' by Congress at the expense of other branches of government. But when
Congress creates a statutory right, it clearly has the discretion, in
defining that right, to create presumptions, or assign burdens of
proof, or prescribe remedies .... No comparablejustification exists,
however, when the right being adjudicated is not of congressional
creation.In such a situation, substantial inroads into functions that
have traditionally been performed by the Judiciary cannot be characterized merely as incidental extensions of Congress' power to define rights that it has created. Rather, such inroads suggest unwarranted encroachments upon the judicial power of the United States,
which our Constitution reserves for Art. MIcourts.'

See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1) ("mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect"); 60(b)(2) ("newly discovered evidence"); 60(b)(3) (fraud ... , misrepre-

sentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party"); 60(bX4) (void judgments");
60(b)(5) (The remainder of the rule not quoted by the court in Benjamin allows
modification for a judgment that has been "satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated .... ." By its terms, such a modification is not limited to equitable final judgments); 60(b)(6) (any other reason justifying modification).
Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 348-49.
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83-84
(1982) (plurality opinion).
" Id. (plurality opinion) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (power of the federal courts over constitutional questions is a 'permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system");
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In reaching the conclusion that a consent decree is not a
final judgment, the district court in Benjamin reasoned that
the source of the underlying right was not an essential element
of separation of powers analysis because "the doctrine... is
concerned with the structural allocation of power in the Constitution, rather than the individual claims in a particular action."2 " Many authorities and commentators would take issue with such a reading of the doctrine of separation of powers. 2 It is through the "structural allocation of power" that
our underlying liberty is insured.24 3 The final judgments rendered in prison condition litigation generally involve rights
guaranteed to individuals under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment.' These private
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.
Ct. 2157 (1997) (holding that Congress does not have the power to modify First
Amendment rights based upon its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers).
21 Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 348.
24 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha 462 U.S. 919, 962 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring)
(noting that separation of powers reflects the Framers' "concern that a legislature
should not be able unilaterally to impose a substantial deprivation on one person"); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(noting that "[tlhe doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted . .. not to
promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power," and that "[tihe
purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident
to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save
the people from autocracy"); Separation of Power--CongressionalAuthority to Reopen Final Judgments, 109 HARV. L. REV. 229, 235 (1995) ([Tihe primary objective
of the separation of powers [is] the preservation of individual liberties against government tyranny."); GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 311 (12th ed.
1991) ("By insisting upon separation of powers, the Framers sought to promote
such aims as safeguarding against tyranny and promoting efficiency .... ").
24 The dangers inherent in consolidated power gave rise to the separation of
powers principle. Separation of Power-CongressionalAuthority to Reopen Final
Judgments, 109 HARV. L. REV. 229, 235 n.59 (1995) (citing JOHN S. MILL, ON
LEBERTY 6 (Stefan Collini ed., 1989) (1859); 1 CHARLES MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT
OF THE LAWS 174 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949) (1748); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1532-33 n.80 (1991)
(citing numerous seventeenth century political theorists who, in writing about the
separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, noted its significance to
civil liberty).
24 The PLRA by its own terms applies to persons "accused of, convicted of,
sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of the criminal law . .. ."
18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(g). Humane conditions of confinement are compelled by the
Eighth Amendment, in the case of those convicted of crimes, and by the Due Process Clause, in the case of pre-trial detainees. Appellants' Brief at 21, Benjamin v.
Jacobson, (No. 96-7957) (citing Bell v. Wolfish 441 U.S. 520 (1979)). Pre-trial
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constitutional rights are at the heart of separation of powers
analysis. As the Court in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. noted,
Congress' power to define rights based on the Constitution is
limited by the doctrine of separation of powers. Given the
Framers' understanding of separation of powers, the nature of
the rights involved is essential in determining the scope of this
doctrine.
B. The PLRA UnconstitutionallyAlters a FinalJudgment
The Supreme Court recently explored the doctrine of separation of powers in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.2 " The
Court was faced with the question of whether section 27A(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 violated the doctrine."
Section 27A(b) retroactively reinstated securities fraud claims
filed pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 193447 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, which were dismissed as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson. 9 The decision in Lampf set forth a
uniform statute of limitations in cases filed under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5."ss The Court's decisions in Lampf and James
B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia"' operated to make the
new statute of limitations applicable to all cases pending on
direct review."ss Section 27A(b) required the use of pre-Lampf
law to determine the limitations period in all cases pending before Lampf was decided.' As a result of the Lampf rule, the

detainees have not been convicted of a crime, and thus cannot be punished. Bell,
441 U.S. at 535. The consent decrees at issue in Benjamin govern conditions at
New, York City jails, such as Rikers Island, and involve the rights of pre-txial
detainees. Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 347.
242 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995).
21 1& at 1450. Section 27A(b) was codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l(b) (Supp. V
1993).
2

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
2- Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1450-51 (citing Lampf, Pleva, Liptdnd, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991)).
248

25

Lampf, 501 U.S. at 364.

501 U.S. 529 (1991). Lampf and James B. Beam Distilling were issued on
the same day.
Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1450.
Id. at 1466 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
25
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petitioners' claim in Plaut was dismissed by the district
court." 4 After passage of section 27A(b), the petitioners returned to court. Their motion, however, was denied when the
district court held that section 27A(b) was unconstitutional." That decision was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit256 and
the Supreme Court. 7
The Court in Plaut concluded that "Congress ha[d] exceeded its authority by requiring the federal courts to exercise 'the
judicial Power of the United States,' in a manner repugnant to
the text, structure and traditions of Article III." "58 The Court
noted that history shows the Framers gave the Federal Judiciary the power "not merely to rule on cases, but to decide
them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article
III hierarchy .

. . .""

Afler examining the writings of the

Framers and other commentators at the time of the writing of
our Constitution, the Court concluded that separation of powers has long been understood as a vital part of our Constitution.2" The Court held that Section 27ANb) was unconstitutional because it required federal courts to reopen final judgments entered before its enactment.26 '
The Court in Plaut distinguished the situation where Congress passes retroactive legislation that must be applied to
cases that are still on appeal or have not become final because

'" Id. at 1451.
Id. (citing Memorandum Opinion and Order, No. 87-438 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 13,
1992).
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 1 F.3d 1487 (1993).
7 115 S.Ct. 1447 (1995).
Id. at 1452 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
Id. at 1453 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1990)) (noting that the "judicial Power" referred to in Article III is the power to "render dispositive judgments").
2" Id. at 1453-55. President Lincoln respected the notion of separation of powers, even in the wake of the much derided decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by U.S. CONST. amends. XIII and XIV:
[Although] it is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in
any given case, still the evil effect following it, being limited to that
particular case, with the chance that it may be overruled, and never
become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the
evils of a different practice.
IV THE COLLECTD WORKS OF ABRAHAm LINcOLN 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953)
(First Inaugural Address 1861), quoted in Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1456.
261 Plaut, 115 S.Ct. at 1463.
25
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the time to appeal has not expired.'

Congress' power in

such a situation is plenary.' That situation does not raise
separation of powers concerns because such a decision does not
represent the final word of the judiciary on a particular case or
controversy." Justice Scalia's holding is clear from the following:
Not favoritism, nor even corruption, but power is the object of the
separation-of-powers prohibition. The prohibition is violated when
an individual final judgment is legislatively rescinded for even the
very best of reasons, such as the legislature's genuine conviction
(supported by all the law professors in the land) that the judgment
was wrong;, and it is violated 40 times over when 40 final judgments
are legislatively dissolved."

The automatic termination and stay provisions of the

PLRA are no different from the type of intrusion into final
judgments condemned by the Supreme Court in Plaut. The
stay provision plainly invites a motion to modify or terminate
prospective relief and guarantees that previously enacted relief
will be stayed until final resolution of the motion.' The statute in Plautprovided that any case dismissed as a result of the
Court's decision in Lampf shall be reinstated upon motion of
the plaintiff.2" The PLRA provides that "[alny prospective
relief subject to a pending motion shall be automatically stayed
.26

....

The effect of both of these statutes is identical: the

final judgment of an Article III court is legislatively altered
without consideration by the federal judiciary of whether such
a modification is warranted.2
The PLRA virtually guarantees automatic termination and
has the same effect as the stay provision. Section 3626(b)(2)
mandates immediate termination of prospective relief when

Id. at 1457.
" Id. (citing United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 US. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801);

2'2

Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 160-08 (1994)).
24 Plaut, 115 S. Ct. at 1457.
265 Id.
2-

18 U.S.C-.A § 3626(e) (providing for a stay, commencing 30 days after filing

of the motion, for motions made pursuant to the PLRA and ending on a final
order ruling on the motion).
21 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l(b) (Supp. V 1993).
26

18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(e)(2).

Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (W.D. Mich. 1996); United States
v. Michigan, No. 1:84 CV 63, slip op. at 15 (W.D. lich. July 3, 1996).
26
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such relief was not granted with the findings required by the
Act."' For instance, the Act requires that prospective relief,
"extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of
the Federal right ..

.. "271 By its very definition, a consent

decree does not involve a decision on the merits, and thus, a
finding by the courts of a particular constitutional violation is
unlikely to be found.272 Nor is it likely that a state or its prison officials will admit in a consent decree that they have violated the Constitution for fear of subjecting themselves to liability on future claims. 3 Such was the case in Benjamin:
"Plaintiffs... conceded that the newly required findings were
not made when the Consent Decrees were entered in 19781979. "274 The district court rejected a request by the plaintiffs

and the United States, as intervenor arguing in support of
upholding the Act, that it delay the decision until a report on
prison conditions in New York City jails was made.2 7 The

court reasoned that since the requisite findings were not made,
the defendants were entitled to "vacatur of the Consent Decrees."276 Plainly, then, the automatic termination provision
18 U.S.C.4. § 3626(b)(2) (requiring termination in the "absence of a finding
by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary
to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.").
1 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(2).
212 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 4443, at
383 (1981) (noting the "central characteristic [of a consent decree] is that the court
has not actually resolved the substance of the issues presented"). See also Note,
The Modification of Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 1020, 1020 n.2 (1986) ("A consent decree is a compromise reached by two
parties that is approved by a judge ....
The parties themselves fix the terms of
210

a consent decree .

.

. and a judge adds his signature to the pact.").

' Joseph Wharton, Courts Now Out of Job as Jailers, 82-Aug. A.B.A. J. 40
(1996); Tom Terrizi, Should Prison Consent Decrees be Vacated? No, N.Y.L.J., Aug.
22, 1996, at 2 ("Of course, with the Benjamin consent decree, as with most consent decrees, there is no such current finding [of the violation of a Federal right]
because the defendants chose not to oppose the relief sought by the plaintiffs and
thereby avoided extensive legal proceedings which would have established the
record of the violations."); Overhauling the Nation's Prisons, supra note 2 (statement of Steve J. Martin, former official with the Texas Department of Corrections)
(noting that "Departments of Corrections elect to settle those cases that they have
determined they are likely to lose at trial," in order to foreclose the possibility of
being found to have violated the Constitution, and to thereby avoid liability to
other prisoners).
' Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 357.
275 Id.
27 Id. The Second Circuit reversed the district court on the issue of vacating
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virtually guarantees that a final judgment of an Article MI
court will be altered in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers as recently interpreted by the Supreme Court in Plaut.
C. The PLRA UnconstitutionallyPrescribesa Rule of Decision
In addition to violating separation of powers principles by
unconstitutionally altering a final judgment of an Article I
court, the PLRA also violates that doctrine by prescribing a
rule of decision." The famous case that led to the prohibition on prescribing a rule of decision, United States v. Klein,
involved a suit by the administrator of a deceased Confederate
sympathizer to recover the proceeds of property confiscated by
the United States during the Civil Wary 8 Under the Captured Property Act of March 12, 1863,2 9 property captured
during the war, which was not used in actual hostilities, could
be recovered upon proof of loyalty." In December of that
same year, President Lincoln issued a proclamation offering
full pardon with restoration of all property rights to certain
Confederate sympathizers if they agreed to swear loyalty to
the "Constitution... and the union of the States thereunder.
. . ."

Several additional presidential proclamations ensued,

similar in substance to the initial one.' Such action led Congress to pass an act directing the Court of Claims to disregard,
as evidence of loyalty, any pardon or amnesty granted by the
President." The substance of the act directed the Court of
Claims, and the Supreme Court on appeal, to consider such a

the consent decree. See No. 96-7957 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997). That decision is briefly discussed supra note 139.
"' See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall) 128 (1871). Although the
courts in the Michigan Decisions did not fully address this issue, the court in
Benjamin did and rejected it. Benjamin, 935 F. Supp. at 349-50.
= Klein, 80 U.S. at 135-37.
12 Stat. 820 (1863).
M'Kein, 80 U.S. at 139.

Id. at 140.
' Id. at 141. The Court also noted that prior to the first proclamation, Congress had passed an act, on July 17, 1862, authorizing the President to grant
pardons to Confederate sympathizers and that Congress had repealed the same on
January 21, 1867, prior to the final proclamation by the President. Id. at 141-42.
The Court held that these acts of Congress had no effect upon the Presidents
plenary power to pardon. Id.
2

"'

16 Stat. 235 (1870).
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4
pardon or amnesty as conclusive evidence of disloyalty.'1

Thus, a claimant, who swore an oath of loyalty and was granted a5 pardon, relinquished any claim to the confiscated proper28

ty.

The Court struck down the act as a violation of separation

of powers. In reaching that conclusion the Court first held that
the Court of Claims was an Article III court."a It then went
on to hold:
It is evident... that the denial of jurisdiction to [the Supreme
Court], as well as to the Court of Claims, is founded solely on the
application of a rule of decision, in causes pending, prescribed by
Congress. [The act provides that t]he court has jurisdiction of the
cause to a given point; but when it ascertains that a certain state of
things exists, its jurisdiction is to cease and it is required to dismiss
the cause for want of jurisdiction.
It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the acknowledged
power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to
the appellate power.'

The Court noted that, unlike Wheeling Bridge, Congress here

was not acting within its own constitutional power to modify
the underlying substantive law, but rather it was prescribing
an arbitrary rule of decision in violation of that "which separates the legislative from the judicial power."2"
The plaintiffs in Benjamin drew an analogy between the
statute in Klein and the PLRA: "In [Klein], the court was required to dismiss the case upon determining the existence of

certain facts-a pardon. Here, the court must terminate relief
upon determining the existence of certain facts-the absence of

particular findings."

9

The statute in Klein dictated that the

Id.
Klein, 80 U.S. at 143.
21 Id. at 144. The Court of Claims was established in 1855 to prepare private
bills for Congress for persons making claims against the United States. 10 Stat.
284

28

612 (1855). In 1863, the role of that court was expanded and given authority to
render final judgments, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. Klein, 80 U.S. at
144.
287 Klein, 80 U.S. at 146.
2
Id. at 14647 (citing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59
U.S. 421 (1856)). The Court also held that by interfering with the effect of a Presidential pardon, Congress infringed upon "the constitutional power of the Executive." Id. at 147.
28 Brief of Appellants at 40, Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (No. 96-7957).
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courts ignore the power of the President under the Constitution. Similarly, the PLRA dictates that the courts ignore the
rights of litigants guaranteed by the Constitution.' Congress can no more dictate to the Court of Claims, and the Supreme Court on appeal, to ignore a pardon by the President,
than can it tell the district courts to terminate prospective
relief in a prison conditions case based not on a change in
conditions or substantive law, but rather based on a change in
court procedure."' The court in Benjamin reasoned that Congress had modified the underlying substantive law and not
prescribed a rule of decision.' Congress, however, does not
have the power to modify the underlying constitutional
rights."5 "[it is illusory to distinguish... between Congress'
inability to restrict constitutional rights and its supposed power to limit remedies for constitutional claims. 'Warring' against
a constitutional remedy is the equivalent of 'warring' against
the Constitution itself."'
CONCLUSION
Congress, in an attempt to curtail frivolous inmate lawsuits and end the alleged micro-management of state prisons
by federal courts, enacted the PLRA in April 1996. In its zeal
to end these alleged abuses, Congress stripped away the ability
of prisoners to enforce their rights, making it nearly impossible
for prisoners and officials to enter into consent decrees. The
Id.
11 Although Klein was decided more than one hundred years ago, it remains
good law. See, e.g., Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 115 S. Ct. 2227, 2234
(1995) (avoiding an interpretation of the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)l)-(3),
which would have violated the rule in Kein); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115
S. Ct. 1447, 1452 (1995) (Klein rule inapplicable because Section 27A(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 modified existing substantive law over which
Congress has the power to change); Robertson v. Seattle Audobon Society, 503
U.S. 429, 438-39 (1992) (holding Klein inapplicable because Congress had the power to alter the underlying substantive law contained in the Migratory Bird Treaty
2SO

Act).
' Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 128, 147 (1871) (citing Wheeling Bridge, 59 U.S.
at 421), affd in part, reo'd in part, No. 96-7957 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1997).
1 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83-84
(1982); Brief of Appellants at 42, Benjamin (No. 96-7957).
Brief of Appellants at 42, Benjamin (No. 96-7957) (citing Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958)) (footnotes omitted).
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PLRA ignores decisions made by state officials, who entered
into consent decrees for fiscal and policy reasons to avoid an
adjudication that they were operating their prisons unconstitutionally. Although Congress arguably does have the power to
limit frivolous inmate litigation and to define requirements for
the granting of prospective relief in future litigation, it does
not have the power to legislatively alter final judgments of
Article III courts involving private rights of parties. Nor does it
have the power to prescribe a rule of decision in such a case.
Such legislation violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
Richard J. Costa

